Peacekeeping has evolved both in its focus and in setting increasingly ambitious goals. In effect, the referent object of peacekeeping-what and whose peace is to be kept-has changed. The peace that is to be kept has evolved from a negative conception of peace to encompassing an increasingly positive understanding of peace.
Introduction
Peacekeeping inevitably has to grapple with what peace and whose peace is to be kept. This would seem obvious for peacekeeping research as well, but over the last sixty years scholars have been mainly concerned with whether peacekeeping ever Peacekeeping has evolved both in its focus and in setting increasingly ambitious goals. In effect, the referent object of peacekeeping-what and whose peace is to be kept-has changed. The peace that is to be kept has evolved from a negative conception of peace to encompassing an increasingly positive understanding of peace (Galtung 1964) . Similarly, the object of the peace has shifted from the global to the national and ultimately the local. Somewhat counter intuitively, this has made the population of the 'peacekept' more inclusive. Whereas originally peacekeeping aimed to secure the objectives of the major powers (that is, the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council) and national elites, its main focus now firmly includes civilians caught up in the fighting and suffering the consequences of poorly governed or failed states. In effect, this has raised the bar for peacekeeping. The expectations of peacekeepers have been heightened both in response to success-'if peacekeeping works in Namibia, it should also work in Cambodia'-as well as failure-'if peacekeeping failed in the DRC because of limited resources (restrictive mandate, etc.), it should succeed if the peacekeepers are given more resources (broader mandate, etc.)'.
The agenda of peacekeeping research has to some extent followed these developments. The focus of the study of UN peacekeeping has shifted from the UN to peacekeeping. Originally, (comparative) case studies (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Durch et al. 2003; Paris 1997 Paris , 2004 ) examined the legal framework of peacekeeping and the management of peacekeeping operations. The international (UN) level provided the core criteria for success: were missions mandated and deployed in time? Was there sufficient financial and troop support? Initial systemic quantitative studies (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2003 Fortna , 2004 Fortna , 2008a Fortna , 2008b ) compared peacekeeping missions to evaluate their relative success or failure, where success is defined at the theatre of operations: do peacekeeping operations make it less likely that former combatants return to fighting? They defined durable peace as the absence of armed conflict. In effect, peacekeeping 'works' if it contributes to a negative peace, where peace does not have a specific content, but signifies a situation without battle related deaths.
Recently, research on peacekeeping has definitely gone 'micro'. The experiences of the local population and the (in)ability of peacekeepers to address their urgent concerns have become main topics for research. Accordingly, the core research question no longer focuses on the absence of conflict, but on the impact of peacekeeping on the content and quality of peace, the so-called positive peace. Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013, 2014) show that peacekeepers protect civilians against one-side violence highlighting the increasingly humanitarian role of peacekeepers. Increasing availability of data with detailed information on deployment and activities of peacekeepers has encouraged researchers to examine their impact sub-nationally. Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis (2016a, 2016b) show that robust peacekeeping limits the conflict episodes in specific localities, while Gleditsch and Beardsley (2015) demonstrate how peacekeeping avoids conflict from engulfing countries. Fieldwork and field experiments use increasingly sophisticated research designs to address concerns of peacekeeping and the 'peacekept' directly (Fortna 2008b; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014, Gilligan et al. 2012; Mvukiyehe and Samii 2012) . Ethnographic research (Autesserre 2010 (Autesserre , 2014 details peacekeeping practices and their failure to secure peace from the bottom-up. In this way research has not only clearly expanded the population of 'peacekept', but also use a positive peacethe improvement of human, political and economic rights-as the yardstick for peacekeeping success.
The remainder of the chapter explores four main themes. The next section considers in greater detail how the evolution of peacekeeping and increasing expectations for the UN to produce both negative and positive peace have shaped the research agenda.
Section three reviews the selection of peacekeeping missions and the supply of peacekeepers, while section four considers the findings of quantitative comparative research on the effectiveness of peacekeeping; in other words, the quality of the peace that is kept. In section five, we provide an overview of the recent literature on the local experiences of the 'peacekept'. The conclusions revisit the main theme, namely that research on peacekeeping has steadily increased the standard and expectations for defining successful peacekeeping.
Evolution of Peacekeeping from Negative to Positive Peace
Originally peacekeeping described observer missions mandated to maintain a truce or cease-fire agreement by keeping the belligerents (usually states) apart. UN peacekeeping built upon the experiences of the League of Nations. Reflecting the post-World War II world, it was not intended as a substitute for sovereignty and limited to address shared concerns of the main global powers; hence the decisive role of the P-5 in mandating peacekeeping missions (Barash and Webel 2002: 351) .
During the Cold War the UN deployed only a small number of UN peacekeeping missions, commonly described as 'first generation' or 'traditional' peacekeeping missions with an emphasis on impartiality, light armament and peacekeeping by consent (Goulding 1993) . The scope of the UN missions was narrow with a focus on monitoring the terms of peace agreements between sovereign states (for example The end of the Cold War not only changed the nature of international conflict and threats to international security, but also increased the space for cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council (P-5). New security threats affected the nature of peacekeeping missions (Chesterman 2005; Diehl and Balas 2014; Doyle and Sambanis 2006) . In the 1990s the erosion of state legitimacy emerged as a primary threat to state, regional and even global security. In the aftermath of conflict, the absence of central and competent state authority not only undermines the prospects for peace. It also destabilizes the political situation in the region (Duffield 2014; Migdal 1998; Nixon 2006; Rotberg 2002) . In response, UN missions slowly transformed in order to substitute for the lack of state capacity and to improve governance (Doyle and Sambanis 2000) . There was a dramatic surge in both number of missions but also size of missions in terms of personnel. In a very short period from 1989 to 1994, the UN Security Council authorized 20 new missions increasing the number of peacekeepers from 11000 to 75000. So-called 'second' and 'third'-generation peacekeeping missions replaced the 'traditional' model of peacekeeping (Goulding 1993) . Third-generation missions moved beyond observational tasks to complex 'multidimensional and integrative missions' with more ambitious goals to promote complex peace agreements and to sustain peace in the post-conflict period (Tiernay 2015) . 
Providing Peacekeepers
The expansion of peacekeeping both in terms of breath and scope has led to new research questions and debates on the nature and aims of such missions. In particular, quantitative comparative research has become increasingly important as a methodological approach but also in terms of theory development. It has been especially successful in challenging common perceptions on where peacekeepers are deployed and whose interests are served.
The common perception in the public but also among policy makers is that peacekeeping missions deploy in the so-called easy cases, while they avoid difficult, controversial conflicts. A similar line of criticism is that UN missions primarily reflect the national interests of the P-5. Both arguments reflect a rather pessimistic view on the role of the UN in managing global peace. Yet empirical research suggests that the UN peacekeeping missions neither focus on easy cases nor merely promote neo-liberal interests. In effect, the answer to the question 'whose peace is kept' has become increasingly complex.
Large-n quantitative research suggests that, if anything, UN missions intervene in socalled 'hard' cases (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004 Fortna , 2008b Hultman 2010) .
Peacekeepers are predominantly deployed to countries with a lack of governance capacity. Here the task for building a stable peace is rendered difficult as democracy and stable institutions are in short supply and the legacy of war includes large number of civilian casualties (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016a) . Recent evaluations of the effectiveness of peacekeeping recognize that this makes it more challenging for the UN to generate successful outcomes (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2010, Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016b) .
Regarding the specific mandates of missions, research suggests that humanitarian concerns and the severity of conflict often motivate decisions of the Security Council.
In one of the first systematic studies of possible bias in UN peacekeeping, Gilligan and Stedman (2003: 38) report conflict severity, measured in terms of causalities, as the key factor for intervention. Humanitarian and security concerns mainly motivate UN operations, but at least in the period directly following the end of the Cold War there may have been a regional bias in favor of Europe and the western hemisphere.
Fortna and de Jonge Oudraat similarly argue that the UN tends to intervene in more severe conflicts (Fortna 2004 (Fortna , 2008a (Fortna , 2008b de Jonge Oudraat 1996) . Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) Of course, even if the UN intervenes in more violent or difficult conflicts, countries that contribute peacekeepers could still be concerned about the welfare of their troops and limit where and how they are deployed. Peacekeepers may end up in relatively safe areas with reliable infrastructure close to their headquarters and major urban areas (Autesserre 2008 (Autesserre , 2010 . Using disaggregate data, recent research has looked at the factors behind UN deployment at the sub-national level (Costalli 2014; Diehl 2014; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2015; Powers, Reeder, and Townsen 2015;  Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016a). Costalli (2014) studies sub-national variation in the presence of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and highlights that UN tends to be active where there was high level of violence against civilians. Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis (2016a) , also using data on conflict and peacekeeping deployment at the grid level, find that peacekeepers tend to be deployed in areas of conflict but with a significant lag of roughly two years. Moreover, for large countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accessibility to urban areas influences the pattern of deployment in conflict regions.
Regardless, countries subject to peacekeeping missions overwhelmingly belong to the 'global south' as critical theorists rightly highlight and problematize (Wyeth 2012 Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013), the pattern of deployment of UN forces (Fortna 2008a (Fortna , 2008b , but also the politics of burden sharing (Cunliffe 2013; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu 2009; Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Sandler 2002, 2010) . Ward and Dorussen (2016) demonstrate countries with similar policy preferences-as demonstrated in their voting behavior in the UN General Assembyare more likely to contribute troops to particular missions. The current model of peacekeepers' provision has however led to debates on the sustainability of missions and on how to provide incentives to participating countries given the exceeding demands for larger missions of more than 12,000 uniformed personnel (Bellamy and Williams 2013; Coleman 2014 ).
The differences between the countries that finance UN missions and the countries that consistently contribute troops have raised questions about the aims of peacekeeping missions. Cunliffe (2013) argues that, in its current form of financing, cosmopolitan UN peacekeeping represents liberal imperialism. He compares modern peacekeepers to the 'sepoy' forces of the Indian army or the 'askari' of the African colonial armies.
The peacekeepers from the 'global south' in effect secure and protect the interests of the powerful Northern countries that dominate the UN Security Council. Whereas Gaibulloev et al. (2015) argue that the remuneration of peacekeeping forces leads to donor-specific benefits for contributing countries, and thus represents a redistribution of resources from developed to developing countries, Cunliffe warns that the specialization of Southern governments in providing peacekeepers undermines their democratic institutions because the military's elevation in such prominent role threatens the democratic polity (Cunliffe 2013: 212 ).
Victor's (2010) study on African contributors of troops shows that, at least in the case of regional missions, poorer countries with lower state legitimacy tend to participate more often in regional peacekeeping. Regional peacekeeping, however, also poses an important challenge to critical studies, since in the cases of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU) peacekeeping is not a further example of Northern 'liberal imperialism'. The divergent approaches to peacekeeping between empirical research and critical theory are also pronounced with respect to quality of the peace that peacekeeping missions provide.
The Effectiveness of Peacekeeping
A number of case studies (e.g., Clarke and Herbst 1997; Durch 1996 The findings of initial systematic and quantitative comparative studies showed that UN peacekeeping can be an effective method of conflict management. Quantitative studies almost invariably find that peacekeeping reduces the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006) . Fortna (2003 Fortna ( , 2004 Fortna ( , 2008a Fortna ( , 2008b The broader liberal governance agenda has also become an object of criticism.
Critical studies theorize peacekeeping as an instrument of the international community to impose global (i.e., Western) values and norms on 'weak' countries (Barnett 1995; Gibbs 1997; Jakobsen 1996; Joshi, Lee and MacGinty 2014; Ignatieff 2003; Richmond 2014) . Weinstein (2005) and Herbst (2003) have questioned whether external intervention can ever succeed at peace-and statebuilding, and instead argue for endogenously supported processes. Roland Paris (1997 Paris ( , 2004 discusses the limits of the liberal democratic peace for post-conflict countries with historically weak states.
He argues that true legacy of peace-building is often little more than giving quasiauthoritarian leaders an opportunity to hold on to power via quasi-democratic elections.
When the concept of peace is expanded to include multiple dimensions then peacekeeping operations are often seen as dysfunctional and ineffective (Cambell, Chandler, and Sabratham 2011) . There are serious concerns about the quality of peacekeepers provided. The limited willingness of countries that have sent peacekeepers to accept casualties compounds the lack of interest by major powers to sustain peacekeeping missions. Inter-organizational communication is slow and regularly fails to deliver the support needed on the ground. Autesserre's (2010 Autesserre's ( , 2014 narratives of the organizational biases within the United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC) further illustrate the impact that dominant cultures within the organization have on the mission's effectiveness to address local conflicts (also see Moore 2013 ).
Recent methodological developments in the study of civil wars allow researchers to use data that vary across time and space at different levels of analysis. As a result, quantitative researchers have started exploring local variations in order to assess the capacity of peacekeeping missions to contain conflict and save lives. While the definition of 'peace' remains quite minimalist, the high level of granularity of the data allow for studies to answer basic questions on the effectiveness of peacekeeping. The current studies converge on the key findings that UN peacekeeping reduces the duration of conflict in a particular location, contains the space of armed conflict, and protects civilians (Beardsley 2011; Gleditsch and Beardsley 2015; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016b) . Regional (sub-national) variations in local capacities can explain variation in outcomes in the performance of peacekeeping operations and from within country comparisons a nuanced picture emerges of how the local interacts with the global (Gizelis 2011) .
What about the 'Peacekept'?
Whereas traditional peacekeeping represents a top-down approach clearly aimed at encouraging political leaders to honor the terms of peace agreements, comprehensive peacekeeping also encompasses bottom-up approaches and recognizes the valuable contributions to be made locally at the grassroots level. Peacekeepers often have a very limited understanding of local conditions and (unsurprisingly given the need of a small number of peacekeepers to control a large area) limited presence on the ground (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016a) . A further complaint is the frequent rotation of peacekeepers (Autesserre 2010) . Pouligny (2006) highlights the big difference between the official version of peacekeeping and local sentiments. Similarly, Dorussen (2015) found in Timor Leste that the official version of peacekeepers building capacity of local policemen to differ markedly from the local version in which peacekeepers are good 'taxi-drivers' with off-roaders that can take you anywhere and good at fixing computers. Furthermore, critical international relations scholars observe that the more recent emphasis on regional peacekeeping runs the risk of a divergence between low (mainly African) and high (Western) quality of peacekeeping (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010) .
The literature on peacekeeping at the micro level has to deal with a number of challenges. Firstly, it needs to be established who are the key actors in keeping peace.
Especially in a post-conflict environment, governments tend to be weak with limited control over its population and territory. Rebel groups regularly participate in peace The diverse conceptualization of peace is a key dividing line between empirical quantitative research and critical studies, as well as qualitative single cases. In quantitative research 'peace' does not have a specific content, but rather it signifies the absence of violent conflict. In this research tradition, the longevity of peace is of interest and the key milestone to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of a mission (Olsson and Gizelis 2014) . The content or the quality of peace, however, brings forward questions about institutional formation, governance, and ultimately the nature of societies and states that emerge through interaction with external actors (Bieber 2005; Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher 2014) . In a similar line of research, feminist theorists have highlighted the importance of the quality of peace for women in particular. Olsson (2009) Bottom-up approaches not only emphasize the importance of local non-governmental and grassroots organizations in reconstruction (Lederach 2008) , but also their role in sustaining (and undermining) peace processes. Peacebuilding policies emphasize the importance of local dialogue and capacity-building, and appeal to local actors; yet they do so through an international template that is overly technical, depoliticizing, and often exclusionary (Paris 2002) . Influential reports, such as Annan's (2005) Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, promote the idea that the UN system dealing with a very different international system requires a new governance-based approach promoting partnerships and local ownership. This approach to peacebuilding seeks to strengthen individual, local and national capacities, building institutions, instigating good governance and enhancing economic opportunities. International organizations, governments, and INGOs have adopted a discourse of capacity building that places more emphasis on local institutions and civil society. Significantly, this highlights the need for good governance to address failures in reconstruction and development as the result of poor institutions and weak capacity. The governance dimension is essential to let people use their power and resources to maximum effect.
In contrast, top-down peacebuilding approaches tend to focus on elites and establishing functioning institutions in a country after violent conflict (Donais 2012; Paris 1997) . Local civil societies and grassroots organizations are generally seen as fragmented, weak, and lacking capacity to fully participate and engage with the peacekeeping and, ultimately, peacebuilding process (Lefranc 2013; Pouligny 2006) . Pouligny (2006) and others such as Richmond (2014) and Basini (2013) are highly critical of the failures of peacekeeping missions to integrate local actors in the peacebuilding processes. Peacekeepers often have a very limited understanding of local conditions and often only limited presence on the ground. This is attributed to the structures of the missions, the rotation of peacekeepers and organizational employees, organizational failures, and finally ideological perspectives that limit the ability of understanding local conditions (Autesserre 2010; Diehl and Druckman 2010) Limited experimental evidence and semi-structured interviews, however, offer an interesting nuance on how different populations among locals perceive the UN missions suggesting that among local populations, women and vulnerable groups tend to be more positive towards UN peacekeeping missions rather than men or local elites (Dorussen 2015; Olsson and Gizelis 2014) .
Critical and qualitative researchers who examine the synergies between local actors both elites, but also at the grassroots level, have highlighted the emergence of 'hybrid peace governance' in post conflict countries that experience peacebuilding missions (Belloni 2012; Bjorkdahl and Hoglund 2013; MacGinty 2008 MacGinty , 2010 Millar, van der Lijn and Verkoren 2013; Richmond and Mitchell 2013) . The authors on 'hybrid peace' are primarily concerned with the characteristics of 'peace' that emerges in the wake of peacekeeping operations.
Conclusions
UN peacekeeping missions have evolved from the small missions of barely 300 personnel in the wake of WWII to the large comprehensive missions with more than 15,000 military personnel and complex mandates. In practice, peacekeepers are now deployed into more challenging situations that involve complex protracted conflicts.
They are also given broader and more challenging mandates to complete a wide range of tasks involving local actors both at the elite and the grassroots levels. Given the complexity of contemporary missions, we may have expected peacekeeping to fail more often. And yet, existing research suggests that despite limitations and challenges, UN missions often are successful in saving lives.
Research has mirrored the transformation of the UN missions and established new and higher standards to measure the effectiveness and success of peacekeeping.
Effective missions should not only provide negative peace by stopping conflict and sustain the post-agreement duration of peace, but also positive peace. The concept of positive peace expands to include the protection of civilians and vulnerable groups of people from residual violence, security sector reform, building state capacity and even support democratization and economic development. Adding to the increasing long list of expectations of building societies, UN missions are often expected to monitor borders, improve stability in conflict 'hot spots' and deter 'spoilers' from challenging the national peace agreements.
In light of the increased expectations of what constitutes a successful UN peacekeeping mission, any positive findings from both quantitative and qualitative research are actually quite remarkable (Goldstein 2011) . The conventional wisdom is that UN peacekeeping is ineffective, yet the review of the existing literature suggests that we not only demand more and more from the blue helmets, but that peacekeepers actually often deliver beyond expectations. Future research needs to highlight the baseline against which UN peacekeeping missions can be benchmarked for a more realistic perspective on peacekeeping to emerge among academics, policy makers, and the public opinion.
